Distributed decision makers are modeled as players in a game with two levels. High level decisions concern the game environment and determine the willingness of the players to form a coalition (or group). Low level deci sions involve the actions to be implemented within the chosen environment. Coalition and action strategies are determined by pro b ability distributions which are updated using learning automata schemes. The payoffs are also probabilistic and there is uncertainty in the state vector since information is delayed. The goal is to reach equilibrium in both lev els of decision making; the results show the conditions for instability, based on the age of information.
Introduction
Agents in a distributed system make decisions to opti mize a performance metric or achieve a more abstract set of goals. These agents must typically consider working with other agents to cooperatively achieve the desired result. However, there is a high degree of uncertainty in these activities. First, the agent may not know the true state of the system as a result of delayed information. The delays may be due to in herent latencies in a network or the intermittent (or periodic) exchange of information. The agents make the best possible decisions with the information avail able [Gmyt:rasiewicz et al., 199lcj . Second, even with instantaneous information, there is uncertainty in the strategies employed by the other agents given the state vector. For example, an agent may not be certain that another agent is willing to cooperate or to what ex tent. Third, even with knowledge of the other strate gies, there is uncertainty in the payoffs that result from the combined actions.
We present a model to capture the nature of these var ious uncertainties with distributed decision makers as players in a game with two levels. The high level concerns the game environment and determines the will ingness of the players to form a coalition (or group). The low level involves the actions to be implemented within the chosen environment.
Both of these strategies are modeled using probabil ity distributions with updates according to learning automata schemes [Narendra and Thathachar, 1989] .
This implies that learning is taking place on two levels and a constraint is that a player must make both deci sions simultaneously, without knowledge of the other players' decisions at either level. In particular, a player knows whether it is willing to form a group but does not know the intentions of the other players. This implies that a player may select an action under the assumption of cooperative behavior but this action, in the context of non-cooperative behavior, may result in suboptimal performance.
The payoffs in the games are stochastic, that is, there is a probability of gain or loss based upon the action set. Uncertainty in information is captured by the as sumption that an average age of information exists in the system. The goal of the model is to capture deci sion making under uncertainty in various domains and to summarize uncertainty as probability distributions. The adaptive learning schemes easily model the uncer tainty, permit expected value computations to deter mine beliefs, and have analytic solutions to complex dynamical behaviors. These schemes may also be con sidered as approximations to more complex reasoning schemes.
In most distributed systems an important goal is to achieve a stable solution. We develop a dynamical equation to predict the behavior based on the param eter settings and apply linear stability analysis to pre dict the onset of persistent oscillations.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes related work; Section 3 develops the model in stages, including the dynamical equation; Section 4 shows ex ample simulations and associated predicted behavior. In Section 5, we make an assumption that leads to a reasonably accurate prediction of the delay required to initiate persistent instabilities in the system. Our conclusions are presented in Section 6.
Related Work
Our interests in distributed decision making are closely related to the evolution of cooperation [Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981] and computational ecosystems. The original description of computational ecologies [Huber man and Hogg, 1988] shows the dynamical equation based on simple gain functions with imperfect and de layed information. A large system of agents select re sources based on aged information of other agents' re source preferences. The resultant behavior can be cat egorized as stable, oscillatory (both damped and per sistent), or chaotic (with possible bifurcations). The agreement between the dynamical equation and sim ulation is demonstrated in [Kephart et al., 1989] and the existence of a general adaptive strategy to elimi nate the instabilities is shown in [Hogg and Huberman, 1991] .
In distributed computing systems, a high degree of physical decentralization leads to aged information such that agents are not able to attain common knowledge [Halpern and Moses, 1990] . The goal of agents in these systems is to make good decisions with the information available and, in particular, to make good decisions involving cooperation with other agents. Other research examines cooperation without communication [Genesereth et al., 1985] and coopera tion with negotiated protocols [Rosenschein and Gene sereth, 1985] .
Our approach is to examine learning mechanisms such as learning automata [Narendra and Thathachar, 1989] in environments with delayed information. The basic research relevant to automata playing stochastic games (and the associated dynamics) is found in !Lak shmivarahan and Narendra, 1982] . Our model extends this to delayed information and a hierarchy of games.
The games in our model represent the payoffs of an un derlying application such as robotics [Gmytrasiewicz et al., 1991a] .
Learning automata have demonstrated coadaptive be havior in a distributed queueing system [Glockner and Pasquale, 1993] . We have also examined learning au tomata in autonomous decentralized queueing systems [Billard and Pasquale, 1993a] and in games [Billard and Pasquale, 1993b] . We view the learning algo rithms as generic in the sense that they capture in cremental, or adaptive, learning.
Although increased levels of communication can re duce the age of information to the minimum latency, there is an associated cost in processing this informa tion. For this reason, it is important to exchange only the appropriate information. This can be done based on expected utility [Gmytrasiewicz et al., 1991c] with agents reaching equilibrium using recursive reasoning [Gmytrasiewicz et al., 1991b] .
The Model
The model is developed in four stages: 1) the ba sic algorithm for a learning automaton [Narendra and Thathachar, 1989] , 2) the algorithm applied to the strategies of two players in a game, 3) the algorithm applied again to the strategies of selecting between two games, and 4) the delay in state information. The salient feature of the model is that each agent makes a decision to work in a group or alone, thus affecting the environmental payoffs, and a decision regarding the action to be taken within the chosen environment.
Step 1: One Automaton -Two Strategies
Let p ( t) and p( t) be the probability of selecting strat egy 1 and strategy 2, respectively, at timet. The prob ability is incremented or decremented for the next time step by { +f3p
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The extent of the incremental change in the mixed strategy is determined by the three constants: (3 is the reward parameter, o: is the penalty parameter, and () is the step size parameter. It is assumed that 0 < o: < (3 < 1 and 0 < () :::; 1. Although (} can be incorporated into a and (3, it is convenient to extract this term for simulation and analysis results.
Step 2: Two Players -Two Strategies
We define two players k, l E {1, 2} in a game D = (D1, D2), where Dk represents a stochastic payoff ma trix for player k !Lakshmivarahan and Narendra, 1982; Narendra and Thathachar, 1989 ] and corresponds to an underlying application. Each player chooses a strat egy i,j E {1,2}, respectively, and the game is played in stages with element at of Dk being the probabil ity of a unit gain for player k based upon the strategy pair (i,j). With probability 1-d�i' player k receives a unit loss. This differs from games with deterministic payoffs as there is uncertainty in the result based upon the strategy pair. In the model, the game payoffs are the expected difference in gain and loss, gfj = 2dt -1, which scales to the interval l-1,+1]. The hi-matrix D is a nonzero-sum game such that both players may receive a unit gain (or unit loss), that is, d}i does not necessarily equal 1-drj·
The decisions are made using randomization and, as such, both players are uncertain as to the pure strat egy that will be employed by the other player. Let p = ( P t, p2) be the state vector where Pk is the pro b ability that player k will select strategy 1 and Pk is the probability of strategy 2. Each player employs an automaton to update the probabilities for the next stage where a unit gain is a reward and a unit loss is a penalty.
The following closely parallels the derivation in [Laksh-mivarahan and Narendra, 1982 ] except that we include nonzero-sum games, delayed information, and a more general notation that permits learning in a hierarchy of games.
Let 8z ( t) = z(t+1 )-z(t). The expected change in the probability vector can be deduced from ( 1 ). For exam ple, with probability p1, player 1 will select strategy 1.
If the player receives a reward, then p1 will increment by Bj3p1• Following this reasoning for all possibilities:
where
( 3 ) and Cf ( p) is the probability that player k receives a reward for strategy i. This is determined as follows.
Let Pk = (Pk P k) be the probability vector for player k.
The expected game payoff, or value of the game, for player k is ( 4 ) where pf is the transpose of P2· Now, Cf (p) = 1Jk(q) where q = p but with the kth element replaced by 2 -i. For example, if player 1 selects strategy 1, then the expected payoff is P2d�1 + fi2 d �2• We recast the difference equation as a differential equa tion as this closely captures the behavior for the typical parameter settings, i.e. small B. Therefore, dp dt = BW(p).
The equilibrium solution is p* where W (p* ) = 0.
Note that the values of the learning parameters affect the equilibrium solution, that is, p*=f ( a,,B,D).
Step 3: Four Players -Two Games
We introduce the concept of multi-level games to cap ture the notion of cooperation in group dynamics, see Figure 1 . An agent consists of two subcomponents, or players, each of which is modeled as a learning au tomaton. One player within each agent makes a pref erence decision between two game hi-matrices A, the non-default game matrix, and B, the default game ma trix. Game B represents the underlying environment when the agents choose not to form a group. Typi cally, the payoffs will be lower but easier to achieve (in the sense of an equilibrium). Game A represents the environment when both agents agree to cooperate in a group with the expectation that better payoffs are available to both agents. However, to achieve these payoffs, the agents must successfully coordinate their actions within the game, perhaps a more difficult task in this game than in B. This second activity, i.e. se lecting an action strategy within the chosen game envi ronment, is carried out by an additional player within each agent. If an agent is willing to play game A, there is uncertainty whether the other agent will agree and, The action strategies are determined as before (using P 1 and P2)· The group strategies are also made using randomization with p3 the probability that player 3 (a subcomponent of agent 1) will prefer A over B (like wise, p4 is the probability for player 4, a subcomponent of agent 2 ). The state vector is now p = (Pb P2, P3, P4).
At the high level, each player uses an automaton to de cide the game preference. At the low level, each player uses a different automaton to select a strategy. The ac tion pair is determined at the same time as the group decision. The resultant action pair (i,j) is played in game A if, and only if, both agents prefer this game matrix. That is, the agents agree to form a coalition with probability c = p3p4, the clustering parameter. Otherwise, the stochastic payoffs are determined by B with the agents operating in a non-coalition mode. The problem of apportioning credit to the different levels is avoided by assuming that both levels receive the same payoff, that is, both receive either a unit gain or unit loss.
An average game is induced based on the high level strategies: Figure 2: Example Games average game. They are also dependent on each other via the stochastic payoffs based on action pairs. The high level strategies are dependent on the low level strategies since the reward (or penalty) is derived in the same way. The potential exists for different learn ing rates at different levels but, in this study, both rates are identically 9.
Step 4: Delayed Information
Since agents are physically distributed, the informa tion available to an agent is delayed. The state vector p describes the probabilities of decisions at both the high and low level and, in our model, is subject to aged information. That is, the agents must make the best decisions possible given an aged view of the likelihood of the other agent's decisions.
Let T be the average delay in information, represent ing the overall effect of latency within the distributed system. For example, latency is increased by periodic broadcasts of information or by the inherent delays within network hardware and software. The latency is a fundamental cause of uncertainty.
Consider a probability Pk(t). We define an aged view of this probability as P"k == Pk ( t-T) where Pk ( t ) = P�o(O) for t < 0. Agent k knows with certainty the probabil ity of its low and high strategies, Pk and Pk +2• respec tively, and has an aged view of the other two probabil ities. From the subcomponents point of view, let p k be player k's view of the state vector, that is, p 1 = P 3 = (p1,p2, P a,p4 ) and P2 = P4 == (pf,p2,pJ , p4)·
In terms of the rules of the game, the preceding implies that a local module, or score keeper, provides a unit gain or loss based on the decisions of the local agent and the aged probabilities of the distant agent. For ex ample, the local module for agent 1 determines the out come based on the agent's pure strategy i and chance, but where chance is now determined by P 2 d il + fi2 di2
(and the average game element dij is also based on aged information).
Now, (5) may be applied using W�o(P k ) instead of the instantaneous vector p. For example, the rate of change in Pt ( t) is a function of p1 ( t), p 3 (t ), P2 (t-T ), and
P4(t-T).
Formally, (5) is a nonlinear delay differential equation (Wiener and Hale, 1992] .
Experiments
Three games, see Figure 2 , are considered with respect to learning behavior and the stabiHty of the proba bilistic strategies. The games are chosen to facilitate the illustration of key points and do not necessarily represent an underlying application. In game 1, the high level choice is between two game matrices, both with pure strategy equilibria of identical payoffs to both players. However, an opposite set of actions is required to achieve equilibrium. In game 2, the matri ces are complements of each other and both are zero sum game matrices with mixed strategy equilibria (the single game is from [Lakshmivarahan and Narendra,
1982]).
In game 3, one ch oice is a nonzero-sum game matrix with mixed strategy equilibrium and the other is the same default game matrix of game 2. Pure Strategy Equilbria (7 = 0) Figure 3 shows the action and group strategies for game 1 in two experiments with different initialization (the delay in the system is zero.) The action strategies are plotted as p2 versus p 1 and the group strategies as P4 versus PJ· The initialization determines which of the two pure equilibria is "closest". The single runs roughly approximate the predicted behavior based on a numerical solution to ( 5 ), that is, the players are able to reach an equilibrium in both levels. Note that the group strategy for the non-coalition equilibrium does not terminate at the origin. Instead, both strategies decrease at the same linear rate and whichever strat egy reaches zero first (based on initialization) prevents and then averaged over multiple runs. We do not at tempt to prove the correlation here but concentrate on the predictions of the theory. Independent of the ac curacy of the dynamical equation with respect to the learning automata experiment, we consider the equa tion to be a paradigm for incremental learning.
We note that the accuracy is affected by the learn ing rate 0: the smaller the learning rate, the better the accuracy. Large step sizes allow the strategies to overshoot the maxima and minima predicted. In Fig   ure 5(a) , the amplitudes in the simulation are larger than predicted but would be reduced if a smaller pa rameter value was chosen. In both cases, the relative delay is the same, i.e. 07 = 15, although the individ ual parameters in the two cases differ by an order of magnitude. For this reason, we may examine the the ory with any value of 0, though we know that a small 0 must be chosen to get an accurate simulation. Note that persistent oscillations are predicted (for the action Probability p 1 Probability p 1 Figure 7 : Phase-Plane Portraits of Action Strategies for Game 2 Near Stability Boundary strategies) and we can say that the delay to initiate such oscillations, r2, must be less than or equal to 150 (for 9=0.1). At lower values of delay, the theoretical strategies exhibit damped oscillations, however, simu lations do not typically show the theoretical damping but rather noise in the strategies. Figure 5 shows that the players reach a rough equilib rium in the group strategies for game 2 but Figure 6 , for game 3, shows that the group strategies oscillate persistently. In this case, we can say that r2 < = 200 for 9 = 1.0. (Other experiments with this game sug gest that both the action and group strategies initiate oscillatory behavior at the same delay.) There is a rough approximation between theory and simulation, again with slightly higher amplitudes in simulation due to the step size parameter. Figure 7 shows the predicted behavior of the action strategies for game 2 for two delays near the stabil ity boundary between damped and persistent oscilla tions. The damped oscillations reach an equilibrium such that the center of the spiral vanishes and the same equilibrium serves as an attractor in the persistent os cillation case (i.e. limit cycle). Note that the circular nature of the phase-plane portrait in Figure 7 (b) is an alternative display of the persistent oscillations, shown over time, in Figure 6 (b). From Figure 7 (a) and (b), we can conclude that 100 < r2 .:::,: : 150. Figure 8 shows the onset of a chaotic attractor , with corresponding shifting behaviors , at very high delay.
As noted in Section 3, there is a complex interaction between the two levels of learning: action strategies af fect group strategies and vice versa. The high delay in the experiment induces the strategies to revisit a vari ety of potential equilibria, but with small shifts in the trajectory. Figure 8( a) shows the specific behavior of the action strategies and Figure 8(b) shows the behav ior of the group strategies. Together, these two figures demonstrate, in four-dimensional space , the complex dynamics of learning at two levels under the circum stance of delayed information.
Analysis
In this section, an approximation is used to determine the amount of delay r2 required to initiate persistent oscillations. The technique involves linearizing in the 
The partial derivatives are straight-forward (see [Lak shmivarahan and Narendra, 1982] for a non-delay zero sum version).
Assuming an exponential solution of the form 6p 1 ( t) = A1e>-t, 6pr(t) = A1e>.(t-T>, etc. yields
Let >. = r+iw. There are an infinite number of discrete solutions and those parameter settings that yield only negative real parts are stable (with perhaps damped, but not persistent, oscillations). That is, marginal sta bility occurs at r = 0. The stability boundary can be determined by substituting >. = iw in (9), applying Euler's formula, and solving for the real and imagi nary parts:
respectively, where X = X 1 X2 and Y = Y1 Y 2 .
Dividing (11) by (10),
(X1 + X2)w tan(2wT) =X= (12) X -w 2 and the instability delay, sufficient to initiate persis tent oscillations, is:
where the inverse tangent takes its value in the interval [0,1l'/2].
Adding the squares of (10) and (11),
where u = w2, B = Xf + Xi, C = X2 + Y2 , hence w = ±fo. The single solution to the quadratic equation is
as the other solution fails to insure a real (the only type of solution) for w (note that B > 0).
We are now in a position to predict the stability boundary between damped and persistent oscillations, the results are shown in Table 1 with the cases from Figures 5 and 6 included. The predicted values Tp are based on (13). The observed values T0 are not from simulation but from long runs of (5) at incremental delay to determine which delay is sufficient to initiate persistent oscillations to within a high degree of ac curacy. There is close agreement between the values and we can draw three simple conclusions: r2 increases with increasing a, decreasing j3, and decreasing 9. The first two involve the relative strengths of the penalty and reward parameters. The adjustment of parame ters to avoid instabilities under delayed information is exactly opposite the adjustments required to insure equilibria close to the optimal value of the game in a non-delayed environment. The last case is obvious from the fact that er is a measure of the relative delay; in fact, the table shows that the delay 1' is doubled as the step size () is halved. Finally, the data suggests that ignoring the partial derivatives with respect to p 3 and p4 did not hinder the analytic prediction (even though these probabilities oscillated in game 3). 
Conclusions
A model has been presented with uncertainty in ac tions, group dynamics, payoffs, and state informa tion. Learning automata achieve equilibrium in the particular cases examined with instantaneous infor mation. This means that an agent successfully em ploys an automaton at each of the two levels. How ever, with delays in the system, the behaviors may ex hibit damped or persistent oscillations and the onset of chaotic regimes.
The analysis yields the delay required to initiate per sistent oscillations; unfortunately, the parameter set tings that decrease the likelihood of instabilities also increase the likelihood that a suboptimal equilibrium will result. This illustrates the fundamental problem of seeking the optimum strategy without being mis led by delayed information. However, the analysis is useful in that agents which communicate often enough to insure T < Tz are guaranteed that persistent oscil lations will not develop, thus insuring the stability of the system. This can have a strong impact on the per formance of the system as stability is usually a prereq uisite for good performance. In general, stability also is a measure of successful learning.
